The efficiency challenge of infrastructure managers is caused by the fact that the current governance does not provide sufficient incentives and means for infrastructure managers (IM) to respond to the needs of the transport services market and to contribute to the optimisation of the performance of the sector taken as a whole. While the recast of the First Railway package has introduced the obligation to infrastructure managers to consult users and foresees use of performance schemes and targets, these do not allow for a structured and continuous dialogue with users.
The Single European Railway Area aims to create an internal railway market where European railway undertakings can provide services without unnecessary technical and administrative barriers. Despite existing legislation, efficiency and competition problems still exist. Strengthening the single market by optimising the governance of infrastructure management, in particular by ensuring that the infrastructure manager (a) performs a consistent set of functions coordinates with its EU counterparts on cross-border issues and is responsive to the needs of rail undertakings (“efficiency challenge”); and (b) allows for effective non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure (“equal access challenge”), is a way in which to assist such sustainable growth.
In addition, the distribution of different infrastructure management function among different market players can lead to inconsistencies in the management of infrastructure and increase coordination costs. Finally, an important condition for completing the Single European Rail Area is to improve the functioning of cross-border cooperation of infrastructure managers.
Conflicts of interest in vertically integrated railway holdings naturally lead to protectionist practices of historical incumbents which impair competition in rail services for all other applicants and thus result in “equal access challenge”. Experience over the last decade has demonstrated that the implementation of current separation requirements did not completely prevent the conflicts of interest and discriminatory practices in respect of access to rail infrastructure and related services. In addition, the existing legal framework has proven to be insufficient to allow detection of and prevent cross-subsidisation from infrastructure managers to incumbents. Even reinforced regulators’ powers under the recast cannot prevent this, as the risk is inherent in the existing structure.
The problems described above and the measures to be proposed to address them will affect a large number of players in the rail market including national authorities, infrastructure managers, railway undertakings and indirectly also passengers and users of rail freight services.
Therefore, a Directive has been proposed through which the Commission hopes to regulate the governance of railway infrastructure. The most important objective refers to the continuous consolidation of the governance of railway infrastructure thus stimulating the competitiveness of the railway sector compared to other transport modes and contributing to the development of the Single European Railway Area.
A reference scenario is also proposed in order to improve cross-border cooperation between infrastructure managers, a cooperation that seems not to be enough. Therefore, the reformation or the regulation of railway freight transport corridors could be proposed. Currently, the proposals which compose the Fourth Railway Package are debated by the Commission and by the European Parliament.
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